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INTRODUCTION

In 1964, while delivering his "Great Society Speech"' at the
University of Michigan, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that, "[e]ach
year, more than 100,000 high school graduates, with proven ability, do
not enter college because they cannot afford it." 2 In 1964, there were
1,037,000 students enrolled in college, according to the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES). 3 By 1965, President Johnson signed into
law the Higher Education Act4 (HEA or the Act). "[T]he Act sought to
bridge the ... gap for [economically and socially disadvantaged] citizens
... by providing [them] the means to pursue higher education." 5 The
President, his supporters, and politicians across party lines recognized the
perpetual struggle of equalizing educational opportunities and sought to
reauthorize the Act less than three years after signing it into law to
provide additional resources. 6 In his proposal, President Johnson noted
that "every man, everywhere, should be free to develop his talents to their
full potential-unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth or
income."' Wile there is no data available from the NCES regarding the
1. Twinette L. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Entrenching the Higher
Education Act to Restore its HistoricalPolicy of Access, 45 U. TOL. L. REv. 545, 552 (2014)
[hereinafter Johnson, GoingBack to the DrawingBoard] (citing ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT
79 (1998) (Great Society social reforms included the Civil Rights Act, Housing Act, Voting
Rights Act, what is known today as Medicare and Medicaid, Equal Employment Opportunity Act
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act)).
2. WGBH American Experience, LBJ, The Great Society, U. Michigan, Primary
Resources: The Great Society, U. Michigan, 1964, PBS (1964), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/primary-resources/lbj-michigan/.
3. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, College
Enrollment Rates of High School Graduates, by Sex: 1960 to 1998, https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/d99/d99tl 87.asp. The NCES notes that "data are based upon sample surveys"
and that "data. ... [from] this table differ from figures appearing in other tables because of varying
survey procedures and coverage." Id. The NCES also notes that, "[b]ecause of rounding, details
may not add to totals." Id.
4. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1219 (1965).
5. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 552; (citing Erica R.
Dines, The Higher Education Act of 1965, THE THIN TWEED LINE (Mar. 17, 2012, 5:19 PM),
http://www.humanstudy. org/students/2012-04-dines-e.html). See also Michelle D. Deardorff,
NegotiationSocial Mobility and CriticalCitizenship: Institutionsat a Crossroads,22 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 335, 342 (2011).
6. The American Presidency Project, Lyndon B. Johnson, XXXVI President of the United
States, 1963-1969, 54 Special Message to Congress on Education: "The Fifth Freedom,"
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=29182 (President Johnson stated that, "The phrase
'equal education opportunity,' to the poor family in Appalachia and to the Negro family in the
city, is a promise-not a reality").
7. Id President Johnson noted that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, during his
presidency, set forth "four essential human freedoms." Id They were freedom of speech, freedom
of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Id. In his Special Message to Congress
on Education, President Johnson added a fifth freedom-freedom from ignorance. Id. He said that
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freedom meant that "every man, everywhere, should be free to develop his talents to their full
potential - unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth or income." Id. During this address,

President Johnson's proposals included the Educational Opportunity Act of 1968 which included
increased funding for student tutoring and counseling, government financial support of the
Guaranteed Loan Program and simplifying existing programs student aid programs so that schools

could tailor financial aid packages to students' individual needs. Id.
8. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, College
enrollment Rates of High School Graduates by Race/Ethnicity: 1960 to 1997, Table 183,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d98/d98tl 83.asp (noting that 49.2% of enrollees were white
but providing no data regarding minority enrollment).
9. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Total
UndergraduateFall Enrollment in Degree-GrantingPostsecondaryInstitutions, By Attendance
Status, Sex ofStudent, and Control and Level ofInstitution: Selected Years, 1970 Through 2025,

Table 303.70, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl 5/tables/ dtl5_303.70.asp?current-yes.
10.

Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 561 (citing

CERVANTES ET AL., TG RESEARCH

&

ANGELICA

ANALYTICAL SERV., OPENING THE DOORS TO HIGHER

EDUCATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE -IGHER EDUCATION ACT 40 YEARS LATER 18 (2005), available

(2014-2015) (citing James Coleman & Richard Vedder, Ctr. for Coll. Affordability
Productivity,

For-Profit Education in

the

United

States:

A

Primer 5

&

at http://www.tgslc.org/pdf/hea history.pdf).
11. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Total Fall
Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions, By Level of Enrollment, Sex,
Attendance Status, and Race/Ethnicity of Student: Selected Years, 1976 Through 2014,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/ digest/dl5/tables/dtl5_306.10.asp; see Johnson, Going Back to the
Drawing Board, supra note I (discussing the Higher Education Act reauthorizations through
2008); see Twinette L. Johnson, 50,000 Voices Can't be Wrong, But Courts Might Be: How
Chevron's Existence Contributes to Retrenching the Higher Education Act, 103 KY. L.J. 605
(2008),

http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ ED536281.pdf (discussing the 1972 HEA reauthorization which
broadened for-profit schools' access to federal financial aid funds).
12.

Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 562; see id. at 560-68 for

a discussion of HEA reauthorizations.
13. See National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Total Fall
Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions, By Level of Enrollment, Sex,
Attendance Status, and Race/Ethnicity of Student: Selected Years, 1976 Through 2014,

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl5/tables/dtl5_306.10.asp (indicating enrollment with high
of 18,082,400 in 2010 and a decrease to 17,292,800 by 2014).

-

number of post-secondary minority enrollees before or at the time of the
Act's signing,' by 1970, there were 7,368,644 students enrolled in
degree-granting post-secondary institutions.9 Between 1972 and 1976,
there would be two more HEA reauthorizations-each seeking to grow
access through grant expansion for the neediest students.' 0 By 1976, the
NCES indicates that of the 9,419,000 students enrolled in undergraduate
studies, there were 943,000 Black students, 352,000 Hispanic students,
169,300 Asian or Pacific Islander students, and 69,700 Native American
or Alaska Native students enrolled in college." And while later
reauthorizations "would highlight the conflicting goals of wide-spread
higher education access and federal fiscal thriftiness,"' 2 post-secondary
enrollment amongst those initially contemplated by the Act (the socially
and economically disadvantaged) continued to grow.1 3 By fall 2014, there

38
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were 17.3 million students enrolled in degree-granting post-secondary
institutions.' 4 Of those students, 3.0 million were Hispanic, 2.4 million
were Black, 1.1 million were Asian or Pacific Islander, and 0.1 million
were Native American or Alaskan Native." These numbers may
represent growth and perhaps precisely what the President and other 1965
Higher Education Act drafters and supporters envisioned when setting
the policy behind the Act as one which would provide wide-spread
access, particularly to the socially and economically disadvantaged.
But, consider the following numbers as well. Of the 17.3 million
students enrolled in degree-granting institutions in 2014, 1,276,609 were
enrolled in for-profit institutions. 16 Of those students enrolled in forprofit institutions, 364,288 were Black, 217,638 were Hispanic, 39,433
were Asian, 9,357 were Pacific Islanders, and 12,183 were Native
American or Alaska Natives.' 7 Those numbers are arresting, and they
should be. They paint a clear picture--college enrollment amongst
minorities has increased over time. But a disproportionate number of
those students are the main "customers" of the for-profit post-secondary
education industry.' 8 While there are many more students from these
groups who attend private and public not-for-profit institutions,1 9 a large
number of these students have been left to the for-profit industry where
they comprise the majority enrollment. 20 This is troublesome because the
for-profit industry is fraught with reports of scandal and abuse towards
the very students who are most susceptible to those things. 21 This does
not comport with the historical policy of the HEA. Certainly, the numbers
point to achievement in access amongst these groups. 22 But, one must
14.

National

Center

for Education

Statistics,

U.S.

Department

of Education,

UndergraduateEnrollment, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicatorchaasp.
15. Id.
16. National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Total Fall
Enrollment in Degree-GrantingPostsecondaryInstitutions, By Control and Level of Institution,
Level of Enrollment, and Race/Ethnicity of Student: 2014, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/

dl 5/tables/dtl 5_306.50.asp.
17. Id.
18. Id. (stating that "a higher percentage of black students . .

attended private for-profit

institutions than did students of the other races/ethnicities shown . . . .").

19.

See National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Total Fall

Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions, By Level of Enrollment, Sex,
Attendance Status, and Race/Ethnicity of Student: Selected Years, 1976 Through 2014,

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d 5/tables/dtl 5_306. 10.asp

[hereinafter

1976-2014

Fall

Enrollment]
20. Osamudia James, Dog Wages Tail: The Continuing Viability ofMinority-TargetedAid
in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851, 855 (2010); Chris Kirkham, For-ProfitColleges Draw
Minorities, Stir Murky Debate On Student Success, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/02/as-minority-enrollments-s_n_916541.html.
21. James, supra note 20; Kirkham, supra note 20.
22. See 1976-2014 Fall Enrollment, supra note 19 (indicating growth of minority
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confront the numbers and then push them aside to fully understand what
stories the numbers tell and what realities the numbers hide.
While many more students than contemplated by the HEA, at its
inception, are enrolled in post-secondary institutions, those very students
are potentially undertrained, overburdened with debt, unemployable and
generally undereducated by the for-profit higher education system.
Politicians can point triumphantly to enrollment numbers. But, when
pulling back the curtain just a bit, one sees that these enrollment numbers
are not making real the purpose and promise of the HEA-to provide
meaningful access to a post-secondary credential that will lift citizens out
of poverty and enable them to become fully functioning members of
society. 23
Today, the higher education sector is largely characterized by
unyielding federal financial aid expenditures, shrinking state budgets,
for-profit post-secondary industry scandal and abuse, increasing college
attendance costs, and an arguably growing need for workforce ready
graduates. 24 The President, Congress, and the Department of Education
(DOE) have responded with a hodgepodge assortment of legislative and
regulatory pronouncements that seek to address these issues through
accountability measures. 25 Many constituents would argue that, given the
current state of affairs, Congress and the DOE are taking the proper action
to correct the problems and thus preserve the federal financial aid which
has made access possible over the Act's existence. 2 6 In fact, legislators
may rely precisely on these reactions. 27 A look at recent headlines paints
enrollment from 1,535,300 in 1976 to 7,180,900 in 2014) [hereinafter White House, Education].
23.

See White House, Education: Knowledge and Skills for the Jobs of the Future, I

(2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education

(stating that, "[A] post-

secondary degree ... is a prerequisite for the growing jobs of the new economy.").
24. M. Ernita Joaquin & Nathan G. Meyers, Accountability, Learning, andResponse Amid
Fiscal Crisis, 47 ADMIN. & Soc. 1015, 1025 (noting that when talking about the system,
politicians (governors in the context of that article) blame conditions on "uncontrollable mandates,
external economic forces, uncontrollable debt and spending, service demands, and inflexible

rules").
25. Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1, at 548-52.
26. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, The Scramble to Save an Aging Student Aid Program
(2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015/09/25/the-scramble-to-say
e-a-federal-student-aid-program/.

27.

In times of fiscal crises, welfare legislation is curtailed and blame accountability

legislation is advanced. See Paul Pierson, New Politics ofthe Welfare State, 48 WORLD POL. 143,

147 (1996). However, politicians have to be careful about curtailing a service the public has come
to expect in advancing themselves in society-federal financial aid. See generally id. They can
thus use the growing government financial aid debt coupled with the reports casting abuse by for-

profit institutions who receive federal financial aid as an abuse of tax payer dollars as the perfect
opportunity for legislators to scale back welfare legislation (such as government funded grants
expenditures and government backed loans) in the name of fiscal austerity-a cause the
constituency can latch on to. See id.
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a daunting picture of the higher education sector-College Tuition in the
United States Rises Faster than Inflation,2 8 Understanding the Rising
Costs of Education,29 How the Cost of College went from Affordable to
Sky High,3 0 US College Students Face High Debt, Shattered Dreams,3
Corinthian-For-Profit
College a Real Rip-Off32 The High Price ofFor33
Profit Colleges. The government's redress of these issues has come
mainly in the form of accountability measures. 34 Thus, politicians can
count more students, particularly minorities, as enrolled in postsecondary degree granting institutions and point to accountability
measures as ensuring that those enrolled in any institution (for-profit or
not) receive quality education.
But in the higher education field (and education in general),
performance-based statutory and regulatory accountability structures, as
they are currently configured, do not work. They create a scheme for
monitoring and advising those institutions which receive federal funding.
But the result is not a system where institutions are free to achieve
prescribed goals through innovation and creativity. 35 Instead, the result is
a more constraining form of accountability with measures so stringent
and pervasive that institutions spend more time counting, reporting, and
determining how they will meet sometimes superficially prescribed
numerical benchmarks instead of creating new programs that will meet
the needs of today's students.3 6 When assessing the historical purpose of
28. Janet Loran, College Tuition in the U.S. Again Rises Faster than Inflation (2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-13/college-tuition-in-the-u-s-again-rises-fast

er-than-inflation.
29. Understanding Rising Costs of Higher Education, (2014), http://www.bestvalue
schools.com/understanding-the-rising-costs-of-higher-education/.
30. Claudio Sanchez, How the Cost of College went from Affordable to Sky High (Mar.

2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/18/290868013/how-the-cost-of-college-went-from-affordabl
e-to-sky-high.
31. Mary Turk, U.S. College Students Face High Debt, ShatteredDreams (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1 0/for-profit-collegestuitionhighereducationstudent

loans.html.
32. Whitney Barkley, Corinthian - For-Profit College a Real Rip Off (2014),
http://www.bestvalueschools.com/understanding-the-rising-costs-of-higher-education/.
33. Barry Yeoman, The High Price of For-Profit Colleges (2011), http://www.aaup.org/

article/high-price-profit-colleges#.VVLq I 45Viko.
34.

See Martha Derthick & Joshua M. Dunn, False Premises: The AccountabilityFetish in

Education, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1015, 1015 (2009).
35. See Kysie Miao, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Performance-BasedFunding in Higher
Education: A Detailed Look at Best Practices in 6 States 3, (2012), https://www.American

progress.org/issues/higher-education/report/201 2/08/07/12036/performance-based-funding-of-hi
gher-education/ (stating that performance-based funding models "were inflexible . .. resulting in

rigid and seemingly arbitrary requirements that focused too heavily on degree completion and
failed to reward intermediate progress.").
36. Id. (stating that these inflexible performance-based models do not "allocate enough

funding to create genuine incentives for colleges to improve").
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the Higher Education Act-to provide widespread higher education
access-this single reliance on quantitative measures only works to
retrench that historical policy.
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn outline a detailed entrenchment
process that describes how a legislative act becomes entrenched as a
super statute. 37 By acknowledging an existing problem, enacting and
implementing a statute which addresses that problem, and expanding and
contracting that statute via appropriate input from the legislature, agency,
courts, and the public, an ordinary statute reaches super status and thus
becomes entrenched.3 8 The statute sheds its ordinary nature to become a
super statute because, through the process of entrenchment, it emerges as
a right, not granted by the Constitution, but still considered vital for full
participation and function in society. 39 Eskridge and Ferejohn provide a
model that sets forth five steps in the entrenchment process. 40 The final
three steps, which are the focus of this Article, are: legislative revisiting
of "statutory ...

[norms] and ...

[reaffirmation] in the face of [that]

opposition and [a]dministrative elaboration of the norm, with further
public and official ... feedback and legislative revision."
Just as the entrenchment process dictates, the President, Congress, and
the DOE, through various legislative reauthorizations and regulations,
have revisited the HEA and its associated norm of widespread higher
education access established and entrenched by the people, over time. 42
But in "reaffirming" the historical purpose or norm associated with the
37.

WiLLIAM N. ESKRLDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW

AlMERICAN CONSTITUTION 19 (2010).
38. Id. Eskridge and Ferejohn set out the following statutory entrenchment model:
Social movement or economic problem creates a demand for state action.
Norm entrepreneur (such as the president) secures spot on public agenda
[.
.] Legislative deliberation, supported by public, generates statute
embodying new norm or addressing critical economic problem
[I ... I

Administrative implementation/expansion of new statute, with feedback and

pushback from media, experts, public, judges
[I ... I

Legislature revisits statutory norm and reaffirms it in the face of opposition
[I ... I

Administrative elaboration of the norm, with further public and official

(judicial, etc.) feedback and legislative revision.
Id.
39. Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1, at 547,
40. Id. The other two articles in this series discussed the first three of the five steps in the
entrenchment process. See id.
41. ESKRIDGE&FEREJOHN, supra note 37, at 19.
42. See Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1, at 560-68 (discussing

HEA reauthorization through 2008).

42
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Act, they have skewed that historical purpose. While access is seemingly
maintained, legislators and law makers rely mostly on performance-based
accountability standards as proof of that maintenance. 4 3 These schemes
focus on performance-based standards such as "student retention and
graduation rates, undergraduate access, measures of institutional
efficiency, student scores on licensure exams, job placement rates,
campus diversity, and, increasingly student learning."' While there is an
increased push to include student learning within these performancebased standards, schools typically have little funding or financial
incentive to explore these qualitative types of assessments when
attempting to meet the traditional quantitative performance-based
standards. 45

With regard to entrenched super statutes, "government . . . [should
create] a structure of mutual obligation ... to enable the average citizen
to have strong assurance that her or his needs are met . . . .46
Accountability schemes, with regard to these statutes, should thus work
to establish a motivating, yet structured, force which enhances practices
and spurs innovative and creative reforms to meet the set criteria. In the
higher education context, accountability then becomes the tool by which
institutions, and the educators within them, are led to achieve a precise
and calculable goal-informing and educating students in a way that will
prepare them for active citizenship and participation in the global
workforce and furnish them with a credential that will help them gain
entry into that workforce. 4 7

-

43. See Michael K. McLendon & James C. Hearn, The Resurgent Interest in PerformanceBased Fundingfor Higher Education, American Association of University Professors, I (Nov.
Dec. 2013), https://www.aaup.org/article/resurgent-interest-performance-based-funding-higher-

education#.V6YdKkrLIU.
44. Miao, supra note 35, at 3; see McLendon & Hearn, supra note 43, at 1.
45. See generally NAT'L. ACAD. OF EDUC., Standards, Assessments, and Accountability,
National Academy of Education, Education Policy White Paper, 1-3 (Lorrie Shepard et al. eds.,
2009),
http://www.naeducation.org/cs/groups/naedsite/documents/webpage/naed_080866.pdf

[hereinafter Shepard et al.] (stating, in the K-12 education context, that even though acts such as
the NCLBA call for states to adopt "challenging academic content standards" with coherent and
rigorous content, varying state standards and an overall recognition ofthe difficulty in establishing
content based standards has reduced such standards to rhetoric while most schools resort to more

familiar "test-based accountability").
46.

See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 37, at 310 (describing the security enhancing

features of the Social Security Act (a super statute) and family law).
47. See id. at 309-10 (citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) and describing super
statutes as security enhancing statutes in that they are the state's attempt to fulfill its "primary
obligation" that "citizens ... be secure [enough] in their persons . . . [and] have secure enough
hold of their possessions to undertake vital cooperative projects"); see generally MARSHALL
COHEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 330 (1%1) (discussing utility and the Greatesthappiness Principle in the context of security enhancing statutes that indirectly promote

"happiness"). This philosophy is appropriately relevant when discussing entrenched super statutes
because they can provide security in the form of rights that are foundational to citizens' ability to

2017]1
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Performance-based accountability standards do serve that purpose and
have arguably been the method by which the public could ensure that
opportunities were available to minorities, women and other
underrepresented students. Historically, codifying and promulgating
these standards has ensured that these students gain admission to
universities, access job opportunities, participate in sports, and have
access other benefits that flow simply from enrollment in and graduation
from a post-secondary institution. But, when performance-based
standards are the only basis for measurement, meeting the performance
standards, becomes the sole goal and thus the proxy for success. 48 They
thus proliferate at the expense of statutes and regulations that would focus
more clearly on content and encourage schools to not just enroll students,
but graduate students with an education that allows them to take full
advantage of what society has to offer.4 9
Through the lens of the final steps of Eskridge's and Ferejohn's
entrenchment model, this article will argue that assessment goals should
be refocused and reset to capture accountability on and assessment of
those things that will truly enable students to flourish in society. To that
end, Part I of this Article will describe how numbers and counting have
been used historically to shape and assess education efforts. This Part of
the Article will also explore how the public has been socialized into
counting and how politicians have used that socialization to advance
performance-based legislative and regulatory accountability schemes in
the higher education sector. This will lay the foundation for
understanding how the production of numbers is relied on and even
expected in assessing higher education efforts.
Part II will describe how concerns about the for-profit post-secondary
education sector have dominated higher education legislation and
regulation as of late. This example will demonstrate how politicians
reaffirm the direction of a statute even when there is vocal opposition to
doing so by choosing the numbers to count and selecting the method by
which to count them. Part III of this Article will argue that this sole focus
on performance-based accountability is not proper with regard to the
higher education provision. In this Part, I offer suggestions to reset or
recast the focus of accountability structures so that there is a move toward
re-entrenching the HEA's historical policy of wide-spread access to postsecondary education.

fully function in society. Access to higher education is one such right. Even though it is not made

fundamental under the Constitution, the process of entrenchment has revealed it to be a right
which is fundamental to a secure a "happy" existence in society.
48. See EsKRDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 37.
49. See Maio, supra note 35, at 3.
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I. WHAT YOU COUNT IS WHAT You GET: REVISITING THE NoRM OF
WIDE-SPREAD ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Eskridge and Ferejohn ask whether "legal constitutional change
merely reflect[s] or . . . influence[s] the lives, identities, and values of
Americans?"so The simple answer is both, especially when considering a
super statute." This is so because the super statute recognizes a right, not
granted by the Constitution, but claimed by citizens as necessary and vital
to fully functioning in society.5 2 Super legislative enactments thus
become entrenched as citizens reclaim the rights granted by those
enactments over and over again by pushing the lawmakers to revisit it as
the public's needs shift and adjust over time.53 In revisiting and reviewing
the effectiveness of programs under a statute such as the HEA, numbers
can thus be very effective in telling the story about certain issues or to
define certain problems 5 4 the public has voiced regarding the statute.
Performance-based accountability standards are not new in the higher
education field. States have used these standards for decades in an attempt
to improve the performance of higher education institutions.5 6 Thy
typically appear in three forms-performance funding, performancebudgeting, and performance reporting. 57 Performance funding is a state
funding allocation structure which "links state funding directly and
formulaically to the performance of individual public campuses on
various indicators."5 8 They have included measurements based on
enrollment,5 9 student retention, graduation, transfer, and job placement.6 0
These measurements are used in state funding allocation processes to
reinforce states' "commitment to college accessibility and ...
[ensure]
...
relatively equitable distribution of per-student spending across
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 37, at 249.
5 1. See id.
52. Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1, at 547.
53. Id. at 559 (stating that the HEA was "devised to be ... that legislation that would again
and again reinforce the power of education to set the country on the path to addressing systemic
inequalities amongst its citizens").
50.

54.

See DEBORAH STONE, THE POLICY PARADOx 131 (1988) (Numbers are used to tell the

story about certain issues or to define certain problems); Lee S. Shulman, Counting and
Recounting: Assessment and the Questfor Accountability, CHANGE: MAG. HIGHER LEARNING 20,
24 (2010) (describing "an account as a story told in quantitative form").
55. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 613-22 (discussing
how the people's "speak" on issues influences congressional and agency action during the
normative debate portion of the entrenchment process).
56. Kevin J. Dougherty et al., Performance Funding For Higher Education: Forms,
Origins, Impacts, and Futures, 655 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 163, 164 (2014).

57.
58.
59.
60.

McLendon & Heam, supra note 43, at 1.
Id.; Miao, supra note 35, at 1.
McLendon & Hearn, supra note 43, at 26; see also Miao, supra note 35.
Dougherty et al., supra, note 56, at 163.
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institutions." 6 1 Performance-budgeting allows "state officials to consider
allocations. 6 2
indicators in determining
campus performance
Performance reporting, which is the focus of this article, "mandates that
institutions and systems provide performance information to policy
makers and the public, without formally linking that information to
eventual allocations." 6 3 In the federal higher education landscape,
performance reporting is not tied directly to funding allocation, but rather
to a post-secondary institution's ability to receive federal financial aid
funds.6
Studies indicating that graduates are ill-equipped to compete
globally 6 5 and increased tuition costs at colleges and universities during
times of economic recession have given politicians ready-made platforms
to promote performance-based accountability standards. 6 6 These
standards are touted as a way to hold universities (who have access to
federal financial aid funds) accountable regarding the level and type of
education provided to students. 6 7
But critics rightly question the efficacy of these types of
accountability structures, citing concerns as to whether performancebased standards will "negatively impact academic quality and rigor, stifle
efforts to improve diversity and provide [meaningful] broad access [to
post-secondary institutions], or divert . . . resources from ... more
effective [reforms]." 6 8 The result of this can often be a dumbing down of
the curriculum or a manipulation of the numbers to reach the mandated
performance-based goals. 6 9 For instance, universities may relax
graduation requirements or adjust course objectives and goals to enable
more students to graduate.7 o
One can look to the history of high school curriculum development as
an example of how performance-based standards can subvert meaningful
61. Miao, supra note 35, at 1.
62. McLendon & Hearn, supra note 43, at 1.
63. Id.; Allie Bidwell, Obama Wants to Tie College FinancialAid to Performance, U.S.
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www. usnews.com/news/articles/2013/08/22/obama-wants-to-tie-

college-financial-aid-to-performance.
64. See generallyMcLendon & Hearn, supra note 43, at 1.
65. White House, Education,supra note 23, at I (noting that in 1990, the U.S. ranked first
in the world in undergraduate degree attainment, but ranks 12 today).
66. Amanda Rutherford & Thomas Rabovsky, Evaluating Impacts of Performance
FundingPolicieson Student Outcomes in HigherEducation, 655 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sc. 185 (2014); see generally Pierson,supra note 27, at 147.
67. Rutherford & Rabovsky, supra note 66, at 186 (some proponents of these earlier
performance-based accountability standards saw them as a way to appease state law makers and
their constituents during times of "increased resistance to taxation and criticism of higher

education's effectiveness and efficiency"); Dougherty et al., supra, note 56, at 164.
68. Rutherford & Rabovsky, supra note 66.
69.

Dougherty et al., supra note 56, at 173.

70.

Id.
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access to education. 7 1 The Great Depression of the 1930s brought on a
surge (yet another in a series of historical surges) in high school
enrollment as educators were tasked with keeping children in school and
out of an already crowded, yet unemployed, workforce.7 2 Less
demanding classes were touted as the way to deal with the increased
enrollment of students who were presumed less intellectually capable.7 3
This began decades long practice of providing a curricular track that
could service students deemed incapable of a more rigorous education. 7 4
This type of curriculum could proliferate because comparing the number
of graduates to enrollment numbers was the calculus by which the success
of high school policies was assessed. Success was defined "more by
quantity than quality," 7 6 and "education leaders ... [stressed] that getting
diplomas in the hands of more students was far more egalitarian than
having all students educated in discipline-based subject matter." 77 Liberal
education tracks still existed, but only for certain students. 7 8 Thus, equal
education became represented not by the content of what students were
learning, but by whether each student was able to obtain a high school
credential. 7 9 This was not a reliable data point because certain students
were being automatically guided to less rigorous programs.
In 1961, a study of Detroit public schools found that students from
71.

Jeffrey Mirel, The TraditionalHigh School, EDUC. NEXT, 14, 15-16 (2006). In 1893,

the Committee of Ten was convened to address the surge in high school enrollment. The
committee was called to address the growing number of public secondary schools and the
curriculum practiced within them. Id. The committee, concluded, after comprehensive study, that

all "public high school students should follow a college preparatory curriculum regardless of their
backgrounds, intention to stay in school through graduation, or their plans to pursue higher
education." Id. This was an attempt at establishing a system of equal education opportunity in

insisting that each student be educated in the liberal arts. Id. The Committee of Ten's approach
drew much criticism with one opponent pointing out that "most high school students were part of

a great army of incapables ...

who should be in schools for dullards or subnormal children." Id.

Another surge in high school enrollment spurred another group called Commission on the
Reorganization of Secondary Education. Id. This group's final report, Cardinal Principals of

Secondary Education, was premised on two assumptions-that most high school students were
less intelligent than previous generations and following a college preparatory program was
unnecessary since most students lacked the financial means, intelligence, and aspirations for
college. Id. These assumptions paved the way for creating a high school curriculum that allowed

students to enroll in courses in line with their abilities. Id.
72. Id. at 17-18.
73. Id.
74.

Id. Supporters of this system argued that because certain students were not intellectual

capable of or interested in liberal arts education, less demanding courses would hold their interest
and thus keep them in school. Id.
75. Id. at 17.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17-18.
Id.
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poor families were much more likely to be led to less demanding
curriculums. 80 Yet, this dual track system and dumbing-down of high
school education continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. ' This

example indicates more than just the sometimes spurious nature of
relying on numbers, but also society's willingness to put wholesale faith
in and reliance on them to assess education efforts. In these instances,
quantitative accountability becomes the go-to standard and not creation
or development of new programs that would address and ameliorate the
conditions making students ill-prepared for a liberal arts education in the
first place. 82 This approach to education reform--counting--does more
than provide a numerical representation of a problem. It also normalizes
the characterization of the problem in terms of numbers and socializes
the public into believing that counting and quantifying is the only way to
determine if the education provision is being property meted out. 8 3 It
gives the impression that the thing being counted (access to quality
education) is actually countable and should be counted.84
Today, performance-based accountability structures impose a similar
construct in higher education. The HEA, through its continued
entrenchment, seeks to establish post-secondary education as a societal
right that will allow citizens to improve their social and economic
condition. However, when the majority of for-profit school enrollment is
comprised of minority and other socially disadvantaged groups,8 5 that
purpose is subverted. While there are for-profit actors that serve the needs
of many students who would otherwise not be able to attend a postsecondary institution,86 too many institutions in this sector engage in
unscrupulous practices that put at risk the very citizens the HEA was
designed to protect.8 7
This threatens the HEA's historical policy of widespread access by
chipping away at its security-enhancing features." Eskridge and Ferejohn
describe security enhancing laws as those that are vital to citizens' social
80.

Id

81. Id at 19.
82. In 1983, a President Ronald Reagan Commission on Education issued a report entitled
"A Nation at Risk." This report recognized the impact of years of dumbing down the curriculum

and stated that it made students in the United States ill prepared for college and the workforce
which was becoming increasingly knowledge based. Id. at 5. This report, touted as
groundbreaking in its recognition of the crisis state of American education, promoted a
comprehensive back to basics approach in terms of reforming school's curriculum. Id

83. See id
84. Id.
85. James, supra note 20, at 855.
86. Frank Donoghue, Who Goes to For-Profit Colleges?, CHRONICLE
http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/who-goes-to-for-profit-colleges/29725.
87. Id
88. EsKRIDGE&FEREJOHN, supra note 37, at 310.

(2011),
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and economic well-being. 89 The HEA is one such security-enhancing
statute that is vital to citizens' social and economic security, as it provides
a means to education. 90 In a joint 2012 report, the Departments of
Treasury and Education indicated that "[h]igher education is a critical
mechanism for individual socioeconomic advancement and an important
driver of economic mobility." 9' It is, for many citizens, the only path out
of poverty. 92
A.

Performance-BasedStandardsServe an ImportantPurpose in
Ensuringthat MarginalizedGroups Gain Access to PostSecondaryEducation

President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society efforts would touch
almost every facet of life in an attempt to root out poverty and lift the
socially and economically disadvantaged out of it.93 His reforms were
numerous and included several "civil rights statutes that prohibited
discrimination" against marginalized groups "in educational programs
and activities receiving federal financial assistance." 9 4 These acts were
meant to ameliorate the pervasive exclusion that many marginalized
groups, including minorities and women, experienced in attempting to
participate in education opportunities. 95 One such act that "helped bring
about profound changes and improved education opportunities for
women" is Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197296 which

89. See id. (describing the role of government in providing a "stable structure for society,"
using laws covering areas such as social security, family law, contracts and property and noting

that such legal provisions were necessary for economic security).
90. See Department of Treasury & Department of Education, The Economics of Higher
Education 3 (2012), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/20121212_Economics
%20of/o20Higher 0/o20EdvFINAL.pdf [hereinafter The Economics of Higher Education]

("Higher education is important for intergenerational mobility. Without a college degree, children
born in the bottom . .. [earning levels] have ... [an increased] chance of staying there as adults
...

[compared to those with] a degree").

91.
92.

Id. at 5.
See id. at 3 ("Higher education is important for intergenerational mobility. Without a

college degree, children born in the bottom . .. [earning levels] have.. . [an increased] chance of

staying there as adults ...
93.

[compared to those with] a degree.").

See Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1 (citing ROBERT DALLEK,

FLAWED GIANT 79-81 (1998) (stating social reforms included the "[C]ivil Rights Act, Housing
Act, Voting Rights Act, what is known today as Medicare and Medicaid, Equal Employment
Opportunity Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act")).
94. U.S. Department of Education, OCR Rights, Impact of the Civil Rights Laws (1999),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/impacthtml [hereinafter Impact of the Civil
Rights Laws).
95. Id. (stating that "[tjhese laws represent a national commitment to end discrimination in

education").
96. Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681 (2012).
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prohibits sex discrimination.97
Title IX states that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ."98
The statute's reach is pervasive and has made discrimination against
women illegal in almost every aspect of higher education. 99 Higher
education institutions may not, in their admissions decisions, financial
aid awards, student and counseling services, or in athletic and student
services discriminate against students based on sex. 00 Title IX also
mandates that post-secondary institutions ensure conducive learning
environments by prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation against
individuals who take action against allegedly illegal education policies or
practices.10 1 The law has been effective in its goal of increasing college
enrollment and graduation for women. In 1970, there were 3,118,942
women enrolled in a post-secondary degree granting institution. 102 By
1980, women outpaced men in enrollment with 5,474,878 women to
5,000,177 men.10 In 2014, women outnumbered men in college
enrollment by more than 2,000,000.104 In addition, "since 1968, the
percentage of women between the ages of 25 and 34 with at least a college
degree has more than tripled." 05
But numbers only tell part of the story. While Title IX has enabled
women to gain access to higher education, there are still boundariesboundaries that will not be highlighted if the only basis for determining
whether women have meaningful access to higher education is counting

97.

Id; Impact of the Civil Rights Laws, supra note 94 (stating other antidiscrimination

acts which impacted higher education access were: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(prohibiting race, color, and national origin discrimination), Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (prohibiting sex discrimination), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (prohibiting disability discrimination), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (prohibiting disability discrimination by public entities), and the Age Discrimination Act of
1975 (prohibiting age discrimination)).
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see CONSTANCE E. COOK, LOBBYING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION: How
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES INFLUENCE FEDERAL POLICY 8 (John M. Braxton ed., 1998).
99.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS To EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX, at 1

(2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ files/crt/legacy/2012/06/20/titleixreport.pdf.

100.
101.
102.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Table 303.70, National Center for Statistics, Education Statistics, U.S. Department of

Education, Total UndergraduateFallEnrollment in Degree-GrantingPostsecondaryInstitutions,
By Attendance Status, Sex of Student, and Controland Level of Institution: Selected Years, 1970

Through 2025, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/ digest/dl 5/tables/dtl 5_303.70.asp?current=yes.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105.

See The Economics offHigher Education, supra note 90, at 2.
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enrollment or graduation rates. 10 6 For, instance, before Title IX, there
were 310,000 girls and women participating in high school and college
sports while there are 3,373,000 playing sports today.' 0 7 But, although
"women now make up more than half of all college. . ." undergraduate
enrollees, "they still don't get an equal portion of the athletic
opportunities." 0 8 In addition, "schools spend proportionately less on
[women]" when compared to their male counterparts."
Women's increased inclusion and protection on college campuses are
testaments to the effectiveness of Title IX. One need only study the
historical data on enrollment and graduation rates. This article does not
argue that traditional performance-based standards related to such data
are wholly inappropriate or that they should be wholly cast aside. That
Title IX has helped women in enrolling in post-secondary institutions and
obtaining a post-secondary credential cannot be denied or discounted.
However, enrollment and graduation data are only the first steps to
ensuring that women and other marginalized groups have the benefit of
more than just access to post-secondary education opportunities. They
must have access to all facets of higher education such that they might
realize the full benefit of being enrolled in and graduating from postsecondary institutions.
B. The EducationIndustrial Complex"i0
The fact that performance-based accountability schemes reached the
106.

Id at 3 (stating that "[w]omen now have higher graduation rates and lower high school

dropout rates, take more Advanced Placement exams, and earn more advanced degrees than their
male counterparts").
107. Before and After Women's' Sports, Sun. Rev., Opinion Pages, N.Y. TIMEs, (June 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/17/opinion/sunday/sundayreview-titleix-ti

meline.html? r=0#/#timel2 264.
108. Maya Dusenberry & Jacah Lee, Charts: The State of Women's Athletics, 40 Years After
Title IX How the Landmark Gender Equality Law Has- and Hasn't Evened the Playing Field,
MOTHERJONES.COM (June 22, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/
charts-womens-athletics-title-nine-ncaa.

109.

Id.

110.

The educational industrial complex derives its moniker from the prison industrial

complex. The industrial complex is used to describe the conflation of government and market
actors in delivering a public good. A hallmark of these industrial complexes is surveillance.
Jeremy Bentham's panopticon theories are instructive here. The panoptic structure was part of
Bentham's proposal for prison reform. Prospect Theory and the Panopticon of Debt, ED TECIE,

3 (Sept. 20, 2012), http://blog.edtechie.net/higher-ed/prospect-theory-the-panopticon-of-debt/.
The panoptic structure is a method by which those subject to it could be socialized to a particular
form of behavior. See Cris Shore & Stephen Roberts, Higher Education and the Panopticon
Paradigm: Quality Assessment as "DisciplinaryTechnology," 3 (1993), http://files.eric.ed.gov/

fulltext/ED368243.pdf. Panopticism rests, in part, upon the theory that persons who are watched
or who have knowledge of being watched are more accountable for their behavior. See THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, CHRESTOMATHIA 106 (M.J. Smith & W.H. Burston
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higher education sector is not happenstance. The HEA was enacted
during a time of significant legislative welfare reform. President
Johnson's Great Society reforms sought to expose and ameliorate every
aspect of life that could or would lead to social or economic disadvantage
through his War on Poverty."' But, President Johnson faced backlash
from the middle class who found themselves ineligible and left out of
most of the advantages provided by this legislation.1 12
The business sector also did not perceive any advantages from the
Johnson's legislative efforts. The anti-business sentiment of the 1960s
could explain the proliferation of Johnson's welfare reform legislation,
including the HEA which, essentially, declared the higher education
provision as a government initiative and not one that should be left to
market forces." 3 But, this same anti-business sentiment can also explain
"greater cooperation among businesses to influence the long-term
political and economic climate for the for-profit higher education model
.... "114 During the 1970s, businesses not only cooperated to address
profits, but also to promote their philosophy of deregulation in relation to

&

eds., 1983) (stating that in a panopticon, security is maximized by allowing the "Master to see
without being seen" such that those who are unseen cannot know that this is the case). The
surveillance or perceived surveillance forces the watched to transform themselves into the
subjects they believe the watchers (the government in this case) want to see. Bart Simon, The
Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection and the New Surveillance, 3 SURVEILLANCE
Soc'Y 1, 6 (2012), http://surveillance-and-society.org/Articles3%281%29/return.pdf.
The
watchers thus set the goals, Janet Semple, Foucault and Bentham: A Defence of Panopticism,
UTILITAS 105, 105 (2009) ("Government creates the parameters of the market place"), and use the
surveillance as a way to encourage the watched to socialize themselves to those goals, see Shore
& Roberts, supra, at 110. The watched thus behave in a certain way and that behavior-practiced
and eventually internalized-becomes institutionalized among the watched. Simon, supra, at 6.
Panoptic structures in higher education share these characteristics in some ways. They do seek to
assert federal power over post-secondary institutions as they administer the higher education
provision and do so with ongoing surveillance in the form of reporting mandates tied to

institutions' continued eligibility to receive federal financial aid. The panoptic accountability
structures in higher education, theoretically, are not meant to "subjugate men" as Bentham's
proposed panopticon would. Semple, supra, at 113. But, they do just that, in practice, as
regulations focus primarily on traditional performance-based standards and not enough on
creating opportunities for access that would benefit those students most susceptible to the
institutions whose actions the regulations seek to curtail.
111. See generally Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1, at 552 (citing
ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT 79-81 (1998)).
112. Cervantes et al., supra note 2, at 36-37. In 1978, the Middle Income Student Assistant
Act was signed by Democratic President Jimmy Carter. Id. This act allowed financial aid access

to the middle class. Id. President Carter said that although this allowance would not be based on
need, it was a compromise to assuage the middle class who felt they were being squeezed out of
financial aid allotments. Id.
113. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 574 (discussing
President Johnson's focus when contemplating the HEA).
114. Brian Pusser & David Wolcott, Politics, Lobbyists, and the Transformation of

PostsecondaryEducation, 10 (2003), http://ncspe.org/publications-files/PusserWolcottl.pdf.
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"political and cultural commitments."" 15 By 1980, "the corporate sector
. . . claimed 50% of Washington lobbying offices and 60% of Political

Action Committee campaign contributions flowing to Congressional
candidates."ll 6
This increased business presence reached the higher education sector
as "issues concerning assessments of teaching and learning practices ...
were debated in the context of general interest in, and concern for, the
quality of higher education."ll 7 Pressures to adopt a business model
approach to accountability put more focus on the bottom line reflecting
"a market-driven approach to higher education rather than . . . [one

focused on] the historic role and missions of universities"" 8 or the
underlying purpose of the HEA to provide wide-spread access. In a
climate of increased fiscal concern and the adoption of metrics to address
that concern, performance-based accountability became the mantra for
assessing effectiveness and efficiency in providing post-secondary
education (and education in general where federal funds were
involved).''
By the 1990s, the deregulation trend that proliferated in business
circles began to firmly plant itself within the higher education sector. 120
Accountability was "expanded to include productivity and various
measures of institutional effectiveness."l21 "Global practices . . . , [such

as implementing quality assurance models, as well as] a shift towards
more public [and] political accountability" led to accountability in higher
education.1 22 According to Leveille, by 1994, one third of all states had a
form of performance indicator system in place regarding education.1 23
115.
116.

Id.
Id.

117. David Leveille, Center for Studies in Higher Education, Accountability in Higher
Education: A Public Agenda for Trust and Cultural Change 6, file:///C:/Users/siu850966917/

Downloads/eScholarship%2OUC%20item%2038x683z5.pdf (2006).
118. Id.

&

119. See Derthick & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1015.
120. Daniel L. Bennett et al., For-Profit Higher Education: Growth, Innovation and
Regulation, Centerfor College Affordability and Productivity, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY
PRODUCTIVITY (2010), http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/ForProfit_-igher

Ed.pdf.
121. Leveille, supra note 117, at 6.
122. Jeroen Huisman & Jan Currie, Accountability in Higher Education: Bridge over
Troubled Water?, 48 HIGHER EDUCATION 529, 531 (2004); Thomas M. Rabovsky, Accountability
in Higher Education: ExplainingInputs on State Budgets and InstitutionalSpending Patterns, J.
PUB. ADMIN. RE-s. & PUB. ADMIN., RES. & THEORY 675, 676 (2012) ("By rewarding organizations
that perform well and sanctioning those that perform poorly, policy makers . .. provide strong
incentives for public agencies to reduce or eliminate wasteful activities.").
123. Id. At the same time, Wall Street began to recognize the for-profit education sector.
James Coleman & Richard K. Vedder, For-Profit Higher Education in the United States: A
Primer, CTR. FOR COLL. AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY (2008), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
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This change also marked a shift away from reliance on accrediting
agencies to do the job of ensuring that post-secondary institutions were
operating effectively.1 2 4 Accrediting agencies focused more on assessing
"academic programs" and not on "financial program integrity."1 25 1In
addition, accrediting agencies "monitored mostly .. . [traditional not forprofit institutions and] not trade or . . . [for-profit schools.]" 26 In
instances where accrediting agencies did monitor for-profit schools, their
metrics were deemed out-of-date and inappropriate for adequately
assessing the effectiveness of those institutions. 12 7 While accreditation
bodies still exist today, they do so alongside powerful federal government
accountability schemes.1 28
President George W. Bush, in a 2002 essay defining his approach to
federalism, touted accountability through measurement as an institutional
framework he would create. 129 This would be done to encourage the
development of measureable standards to which all providers of public
service could be held accountable.1 3 0 To replace accreditation, the federal
government developed a data collection system, benchmarks of academic
quality, a U.S. qualifications framework, and a national ranking
system.131

Shulman likens accountability to a quantitative story-one that is
spun through counting and narrated by numbers.1 3 2 When examining the
purpose behind the HEA and ensuring that it is being met, there are more
ED536281.pdf. The growth of the industry was driven by investors who financed initial public
offerings of the companies who ran these institutions. Id. "[Bjetween 1998 and 2008, the forprofit sector grew its undergraduate enrollment by 271% ...
[with] annual growth rate of 14%
.... while total post-secondary enrollment only grew by 32% ... [with] a 2.8% annual growth
rate. Bennett et al., supra note 120, at 41.
124. See COOK, supra note 98, at 44.

125.
126.

Id
Id.

127. Vickie Schray, Secretary of Education, Commission on the Future of Higher Education,
Assuring Quality in Higher Education:Key Issues and Questionsfor ChangingAccreditation in
the United States 7, https://www2.ed.gov/aboutibdscomm/list/hiedfuture/reports/schray.pdf; see
Eric Kelderman, Facing Pressure on Many Fronts, an Accreditor Promises Reform, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDuc. (Apr. 20, 2016), http://partners4edu.org/facing-pressure-many-fronts-accreditor-

promises-reform/ (describing how the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools
was investigated for noncompliance with federal accreditation standards in the wake of the

Corinthian Colleges (a collection of for-profit colleges) closure).
128. After the 2008, HEA reauthorization (HEA), some question whether voluntary
accreditation would survive after the "public ...

vested greater authority in governmentjudgment

about performance of colleges and universities . . . ." Judith S. Eaton, The Future of
Accreditation?, INSIDE HIGHER ED. I (Mar. 24, 2008), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/
2008/03/24/eaton.
129. Derthick & Dunn, supra note 34, at 1015.

130.

Id.

131.
132.

Eaton, supra note 128, at 3.
See Shulman, supra note 54, at 20.
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stories to tell and there should be numerous ways to tell them. That does
not mean that traditional performance-based stories of enrollment,
graduation rates, and job placement do not deserve to be told or, more
importantly, that they do not matter. What it does mean is that there must
exist, at the federal level, an accountability scheme that will allow all the
necessary stories to be told so that the HEA can serve its historical
purpose in ensuring students' ability to obtain a post-secondary
education. Entrenched super statutes do not enjoy their status because
they promote static and staid rules. 133 Super statutes become entrenched
because they embody the stakeholders' acknowledgment that the right
granted under the act must stand the test of time. 13 4 Thus, when the statute
is revisited, the goal is not necessarily to rubber stamp rules already in
place.1 3 5 Rather, the goal is to assess what is there and determine if
meeting the statute's historical purpose requires developing new methods
and strategies. 136 As Shulman explains in his critique of higher education
counting schemes, "[t]he heart of the narrative is the value added by a
college education to the educational outcomes of students, rather than the
absolute levels [enrollment and graduation] they achieve." 37

H. NUMBERS

GOT US INTO THIS MESS AND NUMBERS WILL GET Us
OUT: REAFFIRMING THE HISTORIC POLICY AND RESHAPING THE

NORM IN THE FACE OF OPPOSITION

Eskridge and Ferejohn note that statutory entrenchment can work both
ways.1 38 It can keep in place norms that reflect a specific societal order
or it can revise that order to keep up with shifts in society.1 3 9 However,
entrenchment goes "wrong when officials vigorously enforce a
regulatory regime's least productive ... directives."1 40
The legislative and regulatory acts in the higher education realm are
reshaping the norm of widespread higher education access into a
133. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 550 (describing the
entrenchment process as controversial because it "attempts to, through statutory enactment[s],

stay [future legislatures' hands]").
134. Id.
135. Id. at 552 (stating that "a super statute does not simply stay the legislature's hand").
136. Id. ("[A] statute that is 'super' because of its entrenched status guides the legislature's
hand as to whether it should be stayed or moved in ensuring that future proposed statutory
enactments stay in step with society's expectations regarding the right the statute grants.").
137. Shulman, supra note 54, at 22.
138. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 37, at 349-50 (describing how America's view
of any kind of "sexual or gender variation" as "malignant" was the norm in society and how that
norm entrenched a regulatory scheme that criminalized such variations).

139.

Id

140.

Id at 305.
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numbers-driven construct using performance-based accountability. This
narrow assessment of post-secondary education efforts remains even
though the need for credentialed workers continues to increase, 14 1 and
those most susceptible to being drawn in by unscrupulous for-profit
institutions make up a large majority of that sector's enrollees. 142
The 2008 reauthorization of the HEA, in the form of the Higher
Education Opportunity Act (HEOA),1 4 3 was a President Bush-era
initiative aimed at addressing these pressing problems at the postsecondary level.14 However, the act does so primarily through the use of
traditional performance-based accountability standards. 14 5 Spurring on
this accountability approach in higher education was the 2006 report by
the Spellings Commission which cited lack of preparation and
information about college as barriers to post-secondary education access
and recommended accountability schemes to remedy the situation. 14 6
These schemes focus on performance-based standards instead of contentbased standards.1 47
Under the HEOA, schools are required to report statistics on
141. The Economics offHigherEducation, supra note 90, at 5 (stating that "[p]ost-secondary
education has become an increasingly important determinant of a worker's earnings"); WHITE
HOUSE, Education, supra note 23 ("Earning a post-secondary degree or credential is no longer
just a pathway to opportunity for a talented few; rather, it is a prerequisite for growing jobs of the
new economy.").
142. WILUAM TIERNEY & GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE, NEW PLAYERS, DIFFERENT GAME:
UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES, 53 (2007) (describing

certain enrollees who are underserved by traditional not-for-profit higher education institutions as
the primary targets of the for-profit higher education industry).

143. The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). This act was
preceded by several acts using primarily accountability standards to address similar issues at the
elementary and secondary levels. In 1994, President William Clinton, in reauthorizing the

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C.

§ 241 (2010), introduced the

Improving America's Schools Act, which allowed states to set their own standards, but which tied
the receipt of federal educational funding to the states' ability to meet those standards

successfully. Shepard et al., supranote 45, at 1, 2. The 2002 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301 (2012), had similar accountability measures tied to federal funding and continued many
of the same accountability schemes introduced in Clinton's 1994 Improving America's Schools
Act. Id.
144. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 566-68 (discussing

HEOA provisions).
145. Id.
146.

SPELLINGS COMM'N, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP: CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S. HIGHER

EDUCATION 7, 16-26 (2006), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/reports/prepub-report.pdf; see Steven Brint, No College Student Left Behind?, CTR. FOR STUDIES IN HIGHER

EDUC., May 2008, at 1, 1-2 (describing briefly the Spellings Commission Report).
147.

Shepard et al., supra note 45, at I (stating that even though acts such as the NCLBA

call for states to adopt "challenging academic content standards" with "coherent and rigorous
content," varying state standards and an overall recognition of the difficulty in establishing
content-based standards have reduced such standards to rhetoric while most schools resort to more

familiar and practical "test-based accountability").
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applications, admissions, enrollment, standardized test scores, and a host
of other quantitative measures.14 8 The HEOA does address other aspects
of higher education, but for most, it does so with the same performancebased quantitative stroke.
If the goal of post-secondary education is to not just credential
students but to socialize them, through education, into fully functioning
and participating members of society, then high-stakes accountability
schemes that essentiall tie continued funding to meeting these goals is
not the route to take. 14 In the higher education sector (and education in
general), accountability structures, as they are currently configured, do
not work because the stakes are too high.1 50 High stakes schemes lead to
cheating and abuse.' 5 1They also narrow the education focus and place a
premium on counting and quantitative measures to the complete neglect
of qualitative assessments of education inputs and student outputs.152 The
punishment for not meeting the benchmarks is a loss of access to funding
which, in many cases, means the inability of a school to operate and the
deprivation of that educational opportunity for students. Such dire
consequences create perverse effects in how post-secondary education is
meted out. And if the regulation stresses performance-based standards
with a focus on counting, then that is what an institution's programming
focus will be. Accountability creates a scheme for monitoring those
institutions that receive federal funding. But, the result is not a system of
self-reliance where those being watched are free to achieve prescribed
goals through innovation and creativity. Instead, the result is a more
constraining form of accountability with measures so stringent and
pervasive that institutions spend more time counting, reporting, and
determining how they will meet sometimes superficially prescribed
benchmarks instead of creating new programs that will meet the needs of
today's students.
Calls for credentialed workers proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s just
as they do today.1 53 These calls led to the expansion of the for-profit postsecondary education sector. Statistics showing the difference in earning
148. See Johnson, Going Back to the DrawingBoard, supra note 1, at 566-68.
149. Shepard et al., supra note 45, at 5.
150. Shulman, supra note 54, at 24.
151. Id. See Valerie Strauss, How and Why Convicted Atlanta Teachers Cheated on
Standardized Tests, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2015/04/01/how-and-why-convicted-atlanta-teachers-cheated-on-standardized-tests/
(describing the case of 11 Atlanta teachers who were convicted on racketeering charges after

allegedly altering and falsifying certified standardized test sheet answer sheets).
152. Shulman, supra note 54, at 24; Shepard et al., supra note 45, at 3.
153. V. Lane Rawlins, Comment, Discrimination, Achievement, and Payoffs of a College
Degree, 9 J. HUM. RESOURCES 415, 417 (1974); The Rising Cost of Not Going to College, PEW

RES. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-of-notgoing-to-college/.

RE1MAGINING ACCOUN7ABILITY

2017]

57

potential of high school graduates versus post-secondary school
graduates proliferated.1 5 4 Numbers such as these grab citizens' attention
and, when put into context, signal a dire future for those who were not
able to obtain a post-secondary credential."' For-profits know this as
well and use the numbers to their favor in lobbying legislators for
continued access to federal financial aid funds.
But, this approach is not enough to detract from reports of pervasive
scandal and abuse in the for-profit higher education sector. That sector's
treatment of students and resultant abuse of federal financial aid funds
has greatly impacted the approach to higher education legislation and
regulation. Reports of the high cost of attending for-profit institutions, the
amount of loan debt that students graduate with, and students' inability
to find gainful employment after graduation have dominated the sector.1 56
In addition, for-profit institutions' high-powered recruitment tactics are
the subject of criticism and debate.' 5 7 For-profit institutions have been
accused of taking advantage of vulnerable students by making unrealized
promises about potential jobs and earning potential, while bilking the
government of millions in the process. 1 5 8 According to Halperin, "13%
of all college students attend for-profit colleges .. . but these ... [schools]
account for 47 percent of student loan defaults." 5 9 Halperin's article
exemplifies the type of statistical reporting that resonates with citizens.
He goes on to say that "[fjor- profit schools are driving a national debt
crisis that has reached $1.2 trillion in borrowing."l 60 While for-profit
schools do not comprise the entire $1.2 trillion dollar borrowing debt,
Halperin still provides a number that presents a daunting picture for
taxpayers.' 6 1 For-profit schools "absorb a quarter of all federal student
aid - more than $30 billion annually - diverting sums from better, more
affordable programs at non-profit and public colleges."' 6 2 "Many forprofit college companies . . . get almost 90 percent of their revenue from

154.

Rawlins, supra note 153, at 417.

155. See STONE, supra note 54, at 172.
156. Robin Wilson, For-ProfitColleges Change Higher Education's Landscape, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.chronicle.com/article/For-Profit-Colleges-Change/

64012.
157.
158.
31,

Id.
Ryan Randazzo, For-ProfitColleges Bilking Public, Senator Says, USA TODAY (July
2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/story/2012-07-31/for-profit-

colleges/56603382/1 (describing a U.S. Senator's report on the ills of for-profit institutions).
159. David Halperin, The Perfect Lobby: How One Industry Captured Washington, D.C.,
NATION (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/179161/perfect-lobby-how-oneindustry-captured-washington-dc.

160.
161.
162.

Id
Id
Id
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tax payers."l 6 3 This "social math" makes citizens absorb the numbers
more easily and provides meaning,' 64 as citizens see themselves directly
impacted by the for-profit higher education actors when they are
contextualized in terms of what "taxpayers" are contributing to a
reportedly corrupt corporate enterprise. The proliferation of these abuse
reports in the for-profit education sector has created a window of
opportunity for politicians to scale back these institutions' abilities to
receive federal financial aid funds and to once again place the issue of the
higher education provision as a government responsibility on the political
agenda.
When considering the students most likely to attend for-profit
institutions (those historically denied access to traditional higher
education opportunities-the economically and socially underserved),
these results and practices produce an outcry from the public that cannot
be ignored. 1 65 This need for politicians to attend to calls for reform from
their constituents provides a ready opportunity for politicians to directly
impact higher education spending in a way that they may not have been
able to before.1 6 6 The for-profit sector serves as a ready (and deserving)
scapegoat.
In 2011, President Barack Obama introduced the gainful employment
rule that would tie schools' eligibility to receive federal financial aid
funds to whether its graduates were employed in jobs that would allow
them to repay their education loans.' In 2010, the Department of
Education promulgated regulations that would address schools' tying
employees' compensation to recruitment efforts, misrepresenting facts
about employment statistics and state authorization.1 6 8
While the numbers from reports about for-profit institution abuse give
rise to these new regulations, they still may not be effective. The numbers
may lose effectiveness if the majority cannot see themselves in the
numbers or do not sympathize enough with the plight of those who are
represented by the numbers. Those who typically attend these schools are
described as "low and middle income people ... [looking] for jobs like
163.

Id.

164. Diane Benjamin, Issue 40: Topic: Doing Social Math: Case Study in FramingFood
and Fitness, FRAMEWORKS INST. (July, 20, 2007), http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/

ezine40.html.
165. Wilson, supra note 156.
166.

See ANNE PRISCO ET AL., ALL. FOR INT'L HIGHER EDUC. POLICY STUDIES, FEDERAL

POLICIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2002), http://www.ibrarian.net/

navon/paper/FederalPoliciesand Higher Education in the Unit.pdf?paperid=1018762.
167.

Halperin, supra note 159, at 1.

168.

Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66832,66832-33 (Oct. 29,2010) (to be codified

at 34 C.F.R. pt. 600, 602, 603); see Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at

572-75 (discussing DOE regulations aimed at curtailing the fraud and abuse in the for-profit postsecondary education sector).
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medical technician, diesel mechanic, or software coder. . . ."and "single
mothers," and "veterans." 1 69 "[S]tudents at for-profit schools [are] ...
disproportionately older, female . . . African American [and first

generation college students].""o While these numbers are staggering and
would move most to demand action from the government on the matter,
they are offset by contextualizing those who are most likely impacted by
these numbers. Just as reports proliferate about the amount of taxpayer
money going to the for-profit industry, numerous reports exist which
separate those who would be impacted from the mainstream.' 7 ' Even if
those reviewing the numbers are included in the count, the stories
represented by the numbers may not fit peoples' individual narratives
about themselves. They are thus not convinced that additional action is
needed to address the issue or that government expense associated with
any action is worth it. Politicians are aware of this and use this as a basis
to continue on with the same practices in assessing higher education.1 72
It thus becomes necessary to reinvigorate interest by recasting the
numbers. Democratic Senator Tom Harkins used numbers but did so in
the context of veterans seeking to advance themselves through
education.1 73 By doing so, his message did more than just focus on the
amount of money going to the for-profit institutions.174 Instead, he
focused on numbers which illustrated how money was being taken away
from veterans and given to corporate entities, resulting in compromised
or no post-secondary opportunities for young veterans returning from
Iraq and Afghanistan.1 7 ' He reframed the frame by counting a group of
people that more constituents (perhaps across political party lines) could
identify with, or at the least sympathize with.
While the legislation, regulation, and even the public's full
understanding of the issues may be episodic, the problems spawning
these enactments and promulgations are not. They are systemic and any
accountability law or regulation devised to address these problems must
set goals and incentives that encourage educators to take a systemic
approach in solving the problems. Thus, the problems cannot be solved

169. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1.
170. Bourree Lam, For-Profit Colleges: Here to Stay, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/for-profit-colleges-here-to-stay/389045/.
171. PRISCO ET AL., supra note 166, at 10.
172. See Joaquin & Meyers, supra note 24, at 1018, 1025 (describing how politicians, in the
context of political speech rhetoric, adopt the blame avoidance culture as they "put issues on the
agenda, mobilize media access and create a shift in public awareness").
173. See Elizabeth Jones, New Report Shows Nearly $2 Billion in GI Bill Funds Go to ForProfit Colleges, PBS (July 30, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/new-report-shows-

nearly-2-billion-of-gi-bill-funds-go-to-for-profit-colleges/.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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by strict adherence to performance-based quantitative outcomes. 7 6 When
assessing the historical purpose of the Higher Education Act-to provide
widespread higher education access-this over-reliance on quantitative
measures only works to retrench that historical policy. Access to postsecondary education should not be just about performance-based
quantitative measures. It cannot also be just about content-based student
learning and inputs either. Access must be about all of those thingsensuring enrollment of disadvantaged groups, monitoring graduation
rates amongst those groups, and delivering content and training that will
allow students to participate as fully functioning members in society.
These are all the goals of the HEA in fulfilling its historical purpose of
providing widespread access to post-secondary education.
1H.

"NOT EVERYTHING THAT COUNTS CAN BE COUNTED... "177
ADMINISTRATIVE ELABORATION TO RE-ENTRENCH THE NORM
THROUGH THE FEEDBACK LooP

As the next reauthorization of the HEA looms, stakeholders across
political party lines and social and interest group strata are struggling with
the formidable task of determining what the focus of the next incarnation
of this venerable legislation should be. During the next reauthorization of
the HEA, Congress must incentivize and not deter creativity and
innovation. "Schools really do respond to the incentives that are provided
to them .. . [but] [t]hat places a huge premium on getting the incentives
correct." 1 78 High stakes incentives aimed at schools keeping their access
to federal financial aid funds are not the correct incentives. Instead, the
current schemes should be refocused, and goals reset so that educators
are properly incentivized to focus on all aspects of the higher education
provision that matter in producing a student who can become a fully
functioning member of society.
One way to do this would be to minimize the punishment aspect of
higher education legislation and regulation and add true incentive
176. "[P]erformance policies are often symbolic in nature and ... many times there is little
commitment to true reform on the part of political actors." Thomas M. Rabovsky, Accountability
in Higher Education: Exploring Impacts on State Budgets and InstitutionalSpending Patterns,
22 J. PuB. ADmIN. REs. & THEORY 675, 676 (2012).
177. Joe Smydo, No Child Left Behind has Altered the Face of Education, PITTSBURGH
POsT-GAZETTE (Aug. 28, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/education/2006/
08/28/No-Child-Left-Behind-has-altered-the-face-of-education/stories/200608280126
(quoting
Albert Einstein).
178. Greg Toppo, How Bush elhcosEducationLaw Has ChangedOur Schools, USA TODAY
(Jan. 8, 2007, 9:27 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-01-07-nochildx.htm (citing a study conducted by Brown University researcher Martin West on time spent
by teaches since the adoption of the No Child Left Behind Act).
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programs. Programs at the elementary and secondary education level
offer some examples. 17 9
In 2009, President Obama established the Race to the Top program
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.'so Under the
original Race to the Top plan, states could compete for school
improvement grants to support education reform through innovation.' 8 1
The program required schools to adopt standards that prepared students
to succeed in college and the workplace and to compete in the global
economy.1 8 2 To achieve this, the program emphasized reform in five key
areas: "Designing and implementing rigorous standards and high-quality
assessments," "[a]ttracting and keeping great teachers and leaders in
America's classrooms," "[s]upporting data systems that inform decisions
and improve instruction," "[u]sing innovation and effective approaches
to turn-around struggling schools," and "[d]emonstrating and sustaining
education reform." 8 3
A similar approach can be used at the higher education level. The first
phase of the program would focus on state schools. States would apply
for the grants, which are tied to reform and innovation with the goal of
expanding access to higher education. States could allow their public
179. Performance-based funding at elementary and secondary levels arguably influenced
the performance-based reporting accountability schemes that currently proliferate at the higher
education level. See generally Denise-Marie Ordway, Performance Funding for Colleges:
Research Roundup, JOURNALIST'S RESOURCE (July 15, 2015), http://joumalistsresource
e.org/studies/society/education/performance-funding-colleges-research-roundup. As elementary
and secondary level schools experiment with student-learning, content-based performance

standards, perhaps legislators will be similarly influenced. President Obama eventually did
propose a Race to the Top program for colleges and universities, but Congress did not pass it.
U.W. Office of Fed. Relations, Obama Proposes Race to the Top for College Affordability, U.
WASH. (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.washington.edu/federalrelations/2012/01/27/obama-propose
s-race-to-the-top-for-college-affordability/ (speculating that Congress would not pass President
Obama's proposal to extend Race to the Top to colleges and universities).
180.

U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE Top PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009),

https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf
181.

JEFF KUTASH ET AL., FOUND. STRATEGY GRP., FEDERAL FUNDING AND THE FOUR

TURNAROUND MODELS-THE SCHOOL TURNAROUND FIELD GUIDE 2010, http://www.wallace
foundation.org/knowledge-center/pages/turnaround-actors-school-tumaround-field-guide.aspx.
182. Fact Sheet: The Race to the Top, Office of the Press Secretary, White House (Nov. 4,

2009), https://obamawhite house.archives.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-race-top.
183. Id One of the most controversial aspects of the Race to the Top program was that states
receiving the grant awards agreed to turn around low performing schools. Jane L. David, Research
Says . .
/ Drastic School TurnaroundStrategies Are Risky, EDUC. LEADERSHIP (Oct. 2010) 78,

78, http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/octl0/vol68/numO2/Drastic-Schoo
1-Turnaround-Strategies-Are-Risky.aspx (noting that turnaround was risky because states had to

ensure that districts were, at targeted schools, "fir[ing] the principal and at least one-half of the
staff, reopen[ing] the school as a charter school, clos[ing] the school and transfer[ing] students to
better schools in the district, [or] fir[ing] the principal and overhaul[ing] teaching evaluation,
schedules, and instruction").
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colleges and universities to compete for the grants. The same key areas
highlighted for elementary and secondary schools could be emphasized
at the higher education level. In the first phase of the program, those
schools which offer plans focused on "[d]esigning and implementing
rigorous standards and high-quality assessments"'' could be awarded a
financial bonus. Since faculty members at many colleges are trained
researchers and are encouraged, if not mandated, to secure grant funding,
the higher education sector is particularly well suited to take full
advantage of a program such as this. In addition, this first phase would
produce a ready set of data that schools and the federal government could
use to determine whether to expand the program.1 85
In return for the grants, states would agree to target those public
institutions that have experienced repeated and significant difficulty
meeting some of the quantitative performance-based accountability
standards related to job placement, enrollment, graduation rates, and
student ability to pass licensure exams. 18 6 Similar to Race to the Top for
elementary and secondary schools, states and targeted schools would
have to work together to draft a comprehensive turnaround strategy. 8 7
Requiring full-scale firings or closures for colleges and universities may
be inappropriate, as there frequently are only one or a few post-secondary
institutions serving the public in a particular geographic area. In addition,
many colleges and universities serve not just as education centers, but as
economic and community centers as well. While full scale firing or
closure should not be completely restricted, it should not occur under this
plan without a comprehensive study of the conditions at the school, the
viability of turnaround, and the impact of a closing or full scale firing on
the community as a whole. To engage in full scale firing or closure
without investigation and study as to whether the institution could be
turned around or transformed could thwart the HEA's policy of
widespread access to higher education.
This plan could eventually be expanded to allow a state to target any
school operating within its boundaries to certify that the school is meeting
certain quantitative and qualitative benchmarks.' 8 8 Under this plan, states
184.
185.

Fact Sheet: The Race to the Top, supra note 182.
Anya Kamenetz, Is 'Grit'DoomedTo Be the New Self-Esteem?, NPR (Mar. 3, 2016,

7:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/03/468870056/is-grit-doomed-to-be-the-ne
w-self-esteem (describing California's testing of students' "self-control, empathy and other social
and emotional skills and . . . [holding] schools accountable for the answers"). Federal law
"requires states to include at least one non-academic outcome in their accountability formulas."
Id. The author also notes that while these are good things for students to learn and thus for schools

to assess, more study is needed to determine the best methods of assessment. Id.
186.
187.
188.

KUTASHET AL., supra note 181.
See generally id.
This would require revisiting the state authorization rule promulgated by the DOE in

2010 as part of its Program Integrity Rules. Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66832, 66833
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could target public colleges and universities as well as private ones
(including for-profit higher education providers) who have consistently
missed existing performance-based accountability standards. Each of
these schools would be required to submit a plan for turnaround that not
only addresses the failure to meet existing quantitative measures, but also
details plans for designing measures for student learning content-based
standards.
Post-secondary institutions could be further incentivized to compete
for grants (from the state award) that would allow for additional research
and development of new courses that would attract students.18 9 A
hallmark of the for-profit school is distance learning.' 9 0 Grants could be
used to develop best practices in that area so that citizens who benefit
most from these innovations have access to post-secondary opportunities
from a larger selection of providers.191 Grants could also expand the reach
of transition programs used to acclimate first generation students to
college.1 9 2
There are signs at the state level that student learin is becoming part
of performance-based accountability standards. 3 The federal
government should take this approach as well. Federal legislators and
regulators must, when considering the next iteration of the HEA, balance
the high stakes punishment schemes with incentivizing programs. Then,
schools can begin the arduous, but necessary, task of assessing what
students are learning and whether that learning is preparing them for life
as fully functioning members of society. The ultimate goal is to not just
count who is in the classroom, but also to deliberately and conscientiously
assess what the people in the classroom are learning.

(Oct. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 600, 602, 603). "The HEA requires that an
institution of higher education be legally authorized within each state to provide a program of
education beyond secondary education," Twinette L. Johnson, 50,000 Voices Can't Be Wrong,
But CourtsMight Be: How Chevron'sExistence Contributesto Retrenchingthe HigherEducation

Act, 103 Ky. L.J. 605, 629 (2014) (citing 20 U.S.C.

§ 1001(a)(2) (2012)). When attempting to

promulgate rules in accordance with this provision of the HEA, the DOE noted that state
authorization would not be overly burdensome for the state because states could authorize by
charter, law, constitutional provision, or articles of incorporation. Program Integrity Issues, 75

Fed. Reg., at 66858).
189. Dougherty et al., supra note 56, at 172-73.
190. Cf Jordan Friedman, Study: Enrollment in Online Learning Up, Except at For-Profits,
U.S. NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/online-educatio
n/articles/2016-02-09/study-enrollment-in-online-learning-up-except-at-for-profits (describing a

study which indicates that more students are enrolling in distance learning courses at traditional
public and private institutions than at for-profit institutions).
191. See generallyid.
192. Dougherty et al., supra note 56, at 173.
193. See Miao, supra note 35, at 2, 5-6 (cautioning that many studies have not yet produced

any meaningful data regarding new performance-based standards).
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CONCLUSION

Legislators and regulators must take a step back from the numbers and
begin the hard work of building a federal accountability framework that
stresses setting and implementing student learning content-based
standards for assessing what institutions do at the higher education level.
A performance-based accountability structure that is set largely in
numerical quantitative schemes only works to retrench the policy of
widespread access. Such quantitative policies do not foster the creativity
or innovation needed to address the issues students face today in
obtaining a diploma that will help them succeed in life. They do just the
opposite. They socialize educators into counters and in the worse cases,
manipulators and cheaters. The HEA was meant to be a vehicle to postsecondary education that would last for generations. As new issues
emerge, it cannot become stymied in its approach to its historical goal. It
must reimagine accountability to keep up with the times and thus preserve
the entrenched status of the HEA so that the access is granted to the
current generation and for generations to come.

